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I. INTRODUCTION
The histories of Canada, the United States, New Zealand and
Australia, despite considerable differences, have certain common features.
These countries were originally inhabited solely by aboriginal peoples
organized in relatively small-scale societies. At various stages, Great Britain
asserted sovereignty over these territories, and proceeded to introduce
European settlers and to establish novel legal and political institutions. Over
time, the settlers grew to outnumber the native people, and the new Britishderived institutions assumed a position of dominance. English law was
generally introduced. Much of the land originally held by native peoples
passed into settler hands, by processes ranging from peaceful agreement to
forcible dispossession. In recent times, all of these countries have witnessed
a resurgence of native political and cultural activity. All are confronted with
a number of complex and inter-related legal problems concerning native
people, problems inherited from colonial times. Among these, the issue of
aboriginal title is perhaps the most significant.
The question is this. When the British Crown claimed sovereignty over
a territory and introduced new laws and legal institutions, what impact did
this have on the land rights held by aboriginal peoples? Were those rights
nullified, or did they survive in a form cognizable by Crown courts? The
issue is complicated by the fact that at least three distinct legal systems may
be involved: the law of the incoming sovereign, native customary law, and
international law.
In Canada, the subject has recently assumed particular prominence.
The Constitution Act of 1982 recognizes and affirms the "existing
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada.'" Yet its
meaning and effect are controversial. The term "aboriginal rights" is not
defined, and the qualifying word "existing" is susceptible of varying interpretations.
My aim here is to explore the principal ways in which North American
and Commonwealth courts have traditionally approached the question of
aboriginal land rights. At least five distinct attitudes may be noted. I will
call them: a) the doctrine of a legal vacuum; b) the doctrine of radical
discontinuity; c) the doctrine of continuity; d) the doctrine of common law
dispossession; and e) the doctrine of aboriginal title. These doctrines are

' Section 35(1 ).
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hardly of equal weight, either in terms of their intrinsic merits or of the
authority with which they have been advanced. Several, indeed, are more in
the nature of judicial flights of fancy than doctrines of real substance.
Others were developed primarily to deal with situations arising in India and
Africa, and are of uncertain relevance in North American and Antipodean
settings.
I propose, therefore, to discuss the first four doctrines only briefly.
The remainder of the paper will be devoted to the doctrine of aboriginal
title, which represents the most significant judicial attempt made so far to
assess the legal effects on native land rights of the advent of Europeans in
North America, and, by extension, in New Zealand and Australia.

II. THE DOCTRINE OF A LEGAL VACUUM
This theory holds that a territory inhabited by so-called ''primitive
peoples" was legally equivalent to a desert land, what is termed terra
nullius. The native inhabitants were mere wanderers over the surface of the
land, possessing neither sovereignty nor permanent rights of any sort to the
territories they occupied. On this view, while indigenous peoples may have
constituted a practical obstacle to European penetration, they posed no
more of a legal hindrance than did the wild animals of the forests and
plains. Their countries were supposedly open to European appropriation by
such methods as discovery, symbolic acts, or occupation, - mod{;!s of acquisition suited to vacant territories -, without any need to obtain the consent of the inhabitants, or even to conquer them. Territories acquired in this
manner would persumably be governed exclusively by laws introduced by
the incoming European sovereign, who would be vested automatically with
complete title.to the soil and unqualified powers of disposition. The land
rights, customary laws and governmental structures of the native peoples
would have no legal existence, except where expressly recognized by the new
sovereign.
This remarkable doctrine is enunciated in the Nova Scotia case of Rex
v. Syliboy,2 decided in 1928. Justice Patterson affirmed:
. . . the Indians were never regarded as an independent power. A civilized
nation first discovering a country of uncivilized people or savages held
such country as its own until such time as by treaty it was transferred to
some other civilized nation. The savages' rights of sovereignty even of
ownership were never recognized. Nova Scotia has passed to Great Britain
not by gift or purchase from or even by conquest of the Indians but by
treaty with France, which had acquired it by priority of discovery and
ancient possession; and the Indians passed with it.
It is not easy for us today to give much credence to this view. When

Europeans first came to America and the Antipodes, they encountered
numerous bodies of indigenous peoples, occupying definite territories to the
exclusion of other groups, factually independent, sovereign within their
borders, and vested with their own customary laws and political systems. As
Justice Judson of the Supreme Court of Canada recently noted, "the fact is
that when the settlers came, the Indians were there, organized in societies

2

[1929) I D.L.R. 307 at 313 (N .S. Co. Ct.).
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and occupying the land as their forefathers had done for centuries. " 3 To the
contemporary mind, aboriginal territories were hardly "vacant land" in
any sense of the term.
However the doctrine of a legal vacuum does not confine itself to
modern viewpoints. In its most developed form it contends, not that we
would be justified today in ignoring the territorial rights of indigenous
peoples, but that as a matter of historical fact the colonial powers did
precisely this. However repugnant colonial attitudes may appear to the
modern observor (it is argued), a court is obliged to take them into account
in determining the legal impact of European rule upon native peoples at the
relevant historical period.
A detailed appraisal of the historical accuracy of these views cannot be
given here. Suffice it to say that they seem sustainable only on a highly
selective view of the historical evidence. In North America, for example,
European state practice was diverse and contradictory regarding such matters as the status of Indian nations and their territories, the efficacy of
discovery and symbolic acts of appropriation, the nature of treaties concluded with Indians, the position of Indian customary laws, and so on.
While European sovereigns often made extravagant territorial claims on
their own accounts, they usually proved more circumspect when it came to
appraising the claims of rival powers, and they often adopted yet another
posture in direct dealings with Indian nations. While a certain amount of
evidence supports the contention that European sovereigns viewed North
America as terra nullius and treated its native inhabitants as lacking any
corporate legal existence or land rights, there is a considerable body of
historical data inconsistent with this view. 4 Any proper assessment must
take both bodies of evidence into account.
A few examples may be cited. Blackstone, in bis Commentaries on the
Laws of England, divides colonial territories into two categories, depending
in effect on whether or not they were terra nul/ius when the Crown entered.
If they were vacant, then they could be acquired by mere occupancy; if they

Calderv. Attorney-General of British Columbia (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 at 156
(S.C.C.).
• See, e.g., Cyrus Thomas, "Introduction" in Indian Land Cessions in the United
States by Charles C. Royce, (1896-97) Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of
American Ethnology, Part II (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1899); Jack Stagg, Anglo-Indian Relations in North America to 1763 and an
Analysis of the Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763 (Ottawa: Research
Bra?ch, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1981); Brian Slattery, "French
Claims in North America, 1500-59" (1978), 59 Canadian Historical Review 139
reprinted as No. 1, Studies in Aboriginal Rights (Saskatoon: University of
S~skatchewan N.ative Law Centre, 1980); Brian Slattery, Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, as Affected by the Crown's Acquisition of Their
Terr!tories, Doctora~ Di~sertation, Faculty of Law, Oxford University, 1979,
reprinted by the Umvers1ty of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre 1979 esp. at
3

66-125.
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were already populated, they could only be gained by conquest or cession.
His words are as follows:
Plantations, or colonies in distant countries, are either such where the
lands are claimed by right of occupancy only, by finding them desert and
uncultivated, and peopling them from the mother country; or where,
when already cultivated, they have been either gained by conquest, or
ceded to us by treaties.'

There is a certain ambiguity in this passage. At first sight, the author
might seem to suggest that a territory, although populated, could be regarded as vacant if it were not cultivated by the inhabitants, but used primarily
for pastoral purposes, or for hunting, fishing and gathering. The argument
could then be made that the hunting territories of American Indians were
"desert" and open to occupation by settlers. However Blackstone goes on
to dispell this impression, stating that the American plantations were principally of the conquered and ceded variety "being obtained in the last century either by right of conquest and driving out the natives {with what
natural justice I shall not at present enquire) or by treaties. " 6 The American
colonies were not gained by mere occupancy, for the simple reason that they
were for the most part already supplied with inhabitants.
Blackstone elaborates on this point in a subsequent chapter of the
Commentaries where he discusses the origins of the institution of property.
After a period of primitive communality, he writes, mankind reached a
stage where it became an acknowledged right for a person to occupy any
lands not already occupied by others. "Upon the same principle", he
declares,
was founded the right of migration, of sending colonies to find out new
habitations, when the mother-country was overcharged with inhabitants;
which was practised as well by the Phaenicians and Greeks, as the Germans, Scythians, and other northern people. And, so long as it was confined to the stocking and cultivation of desert uninhabited countries, it
kept strictly within the limits of the law of nature. But how far the seizing
on countries already peopled, and driving out or massacring the innocent
and defenceless natives, merely because they differed from their invaders
in language, in religion, in customs, in government, or in colour; how far
such a conduct was consonant to nature, to reason, or to christianity,

' William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, !st ed. (Oxford;
Clarendon Press, 1765),, Vol. I, 104; spelling modernized.
• Ibid., at 105. It seems clear that Blackstone included in this statement the
populous colonies on the American continent, and not merely the island colonies
of the Caribbean. Certainly a later American editor understands him in this sense;
see William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, ed. by St.
George Tucker (Philadelphia: Birch and Small, 1803), Vol. I, Appendix, 381~84.
The suggestion that Blackstone had the Caribbean colonies in mind was made in
Milirrpum v. Naba/co Pty. Ltd. (1971), 17 F.L.R. 141 at 202 (Aust. N.T.S.C.),
but this view seems to have no historical or textual basis.
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deserved well to be considered by those, who have rendered their names
immortal by thus civilizing mankind.'
It was not legitimate, then, to seize populated territories merely because
their inhabitants had different customs and religions. Such countries could
not be deemed "vacant" and open to occupation.
· The issue arose in a concrete form following the Treaty of Paris (1763),
in which France and Spain ceded to Britain their claims to extensive
American territories. At that period there was considerable pressure from
the old! British colonies along the Atlantic seaboard to settle the lands west
of the Appalachians, which were held by the Indians. The British Crown
could have maintained that such lands, being for the most part uncultivated, were open to European occupancy without consideration of Indian title. However the Crown did not adopt this view. On 7 October 1763,
a Royal Proclamation was issued containing extensive provisions regardling
Indian lands. The preamble to this part recites that
it is just and reasonable, and essential to Our Interest and the Security of
Our Colonies that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians, with whom
We are conn~cted and who live under Our Protection, should not be
molested or disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions
and Territories as, not having been ceded to, or purchased by Us, are
reserved to them, or any of them, as their Hunting Groundls .... '
The Proclamation, then, treats Indian nations as protected peopl~s
under the Crown's overall sovereignty, and presupposes that they retam
rights to unceded lands in their possession. It goes on to lay down detailed
provisions protecting Indian lands from encroachment and fraudulent purchases. In particular it forbids colonial Governors to grant away unsurrendered Indian lands and prohibits settlement on them. Private purchases
of Indian lands are outlawed, and a system of public purchases is
substituted. 9
The Proclamation's provisions were reinforced by Royal Instructions
sent that same year to the Governors of the new colonies of Quebec, East
Florida, and West Florida. 10 The Instructions for Quebec (which are virtually identical with those issued for the Floridas) recite that the province
"is in part inhabited and possessed by several nations and tribes of Indians,
with whom it is both necessary and expedient to cultivate and maintain a
strict friendship and good correspondence, so that they may be induced by

Blackstone, supra, note 5, 1st ed., II, 7; spelling modlernized. .
.
' Text in Clarence S. Brigham, ed., British Royal Proclamatwns Relatmg to

1

America, Vol. 12, Transactions and Collections of the American Antiquarian
Society (Worcester, Mass.: American Antiquarian Society, 1911), 212-18, at .215.
• For detailed analysis of the Proclamation's provisions, see Slattery, Land Rights
of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, supra, note 4, at 191-349: .
.
10 Text in Leonard W. Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions to Bnt1sh Colonial Governors, 1670-1776, 2 vols. (New Yorlc: D. Appleton-Century Comp., 1935), Vol. II,
478-80.
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degrees not only to be good neighbours to our subjects but likewise
themselves to become good subjects to us ... ". The Governor of Quebec
should appoint persons "to assemble and treat with the said Indians, promising and assuring them of protection and friendship on our part. .. ". The
Instructions also require the Governor to determine the number, nature and
disposition of the Indian tribes "and the rules and constitutions by which
they are governed or regulated". The document goes on to state: "you are
upon no account to molest or disturb them [the Indian tribes] in the possession,,of such parts of the said province as they at present occupy or possess
Many other examples of this type could be cited. The few given here
may serve to counter the notion that European powers uniformly dealt with
North American lands as if they were vacant, ignoring the presence of the
aboriginal peoples.

Doctrine of Radical Discontinuity

III. THE DOCTRINE OF RADICAL DISCONTINUITY
This theory, unlike the first, does not necessarily maintain that native
peoples possessed no rights to their lands prior to European rule. It holds
that, in British law, whenever the Crown acquires a new overseas. territory,
be it by conquest, cession, or peaceful settlement, the land rights of the local
people are automatically terminated. The Crown obtains a complete title to
the soil and absolute powers of disposal. There is a radical discontinuity
between the situation prior to the Crown's coming and that prevailing afterwards. Whatever land rights the native inhabitants enjoy under the new
regime must trace their origin to some official act of the incoming
sovereign.
Authority for this proposition derives mainly from dicta in several
Privy Council decisions concerning India. 11 A striking example is found in
Vajesingji Joravarsingji v. Secretary of State for India in Council, 12 where
Lord Dunedin said:
... when a territory is acquired by a sovereign state for the first time that
is an act of state. It matters not how the acquisition has been brought
about. It may be by conquest, it may be by cession following on treaty, it
may be by occupation of territory hitherto unoccupied by a recognised
ruler. In all cases the result is the same. Any inhabitant of the territory can
make good in the municipal courts established by the new sovereign only
such rights as that sovereign has, through his officers, recognised. Such
rights as he had under the rule of predecessors avail him nothing.

It seems doubtful whether this can be taken as a correct statement of
the law, at least in this bald form. There is a basic difference between
recognizing that the Crown may lawfully appropriate privately-held property when a new territory is acquired, and asserting that all private land rights
are automatically nullified without any Crown action at all. The decisions
which appear to espouse a doctrine of radical discontinuity can, I think, be
explained on another basis: at the time the particular territories in question
were acquired, the Crown explicitly elected to review local property rights,
and proceeded to modify or terminate some of these." This is very different

'' For discussion and references see Slattery, Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian
Peoples, supra, note 4, at 45-62.
" (1924), L.R. 51 Ind. App. 357 at 360 (P.C.).
" See Slattery, Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, supra, note 4, at
50-59.
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from the situation where the Crown is content to let the existing situation
stand without acting one way or the other, or where it implicitly accepts existing property rights in its dealings with the local inhabitants.
In any case, it is difficult to see how the proposed doctrine could be
carried out in a thoroughgoing way. Can it seriously be maintained that at
the instant of acquisition the total population of a country become squatters
in their own dwellings, and trespassers in their own gardens? The result is so
drastic that it seems implausible that it should occur by the silent and
automatic operation of the law alone, without definite state action.

Doctrine of Continuity

IV. THE DOCTRINE OF CONTINUITY
A more sophisticated view of the law can be found in a series of Privy
Council decisions originating mainly from Africa that adopt a principle of
presumptive continuity. This doctrine distinguishes between sovereignty
and private property rights and holds that the Crown's acquisition of
sovereignty over a new territory does not automatically entail the confiscation of all private property. Rather the presumption is to the contrary.
Although the Crown initially holds the power to terminate local property
rights as an act of state, if it elects not to exercise that power, then local
rights are presumed to survive intact, subject to any modifications
necessarily flowing from the change of sovereignty proper. This doctrine
posits a measure of legal continuity between the old regime and the new, in
the absence of official acts to the contrary.
The principle of continuity was adopted by the Privy Council in
Oyekan v. Adele,' 4 where Lord Denning summarized the effect of the
Crown's acquisition of sovereignty over a newly ceded territory in the
following manner:
The effect ... is to give to the British Crown sovereign power to make
laws and to enforce them, and, therefore, the power to recognise existing
rights or extinguish them, or to create new ones. In order to ascertain what
rights pass to the Crown or are retained by the inhabitants, the courts of
law look ... to the conduct of the British Crown. It has been laid down
by their Lordships' Board that "Any inhabitant of the territory can make
good in the municipal courts established by the new sovereign only such
rights as that sovereign has, through his officers, recognised. Such rights
as he had under the rule of his predecessors avail him nothing." ... In inquiring, however, what rights are recognised, there is one guiding principle. It is this: The courts will assume that the British Crown intends that
the rights of property of the inhabitants are to be fully respected.
This doctrine suggests that, absent contrary acts, the original land

rights of native peoples survived the process whereby the Crown gained control over their territories. Its application in the North American context was
accepted by Justice Hall of the Supreme Court of Canada in Calder v.
Attorney-General of British Columbia,' 5 where he stated:
•• [1957] 2 All E.R. 785 at 788 (P.C.); references omitted. For other authorities see
Slattery, Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, supra, note 4, at 49,
50-62.
" (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 at 208 (S.C.C.).
10

The appe~Iants [officers of the Nishga Indian Tribal Council] rely on the
presumption that the British Crown intended to respect native rights·
therefore, wh.en the Nishga people came under British sovereignty .. '.
they v.:ere e?tltled to assert, as a legal right, their Indian title. It being a
legal nght, it could not thereafter be extinguished except by surrender to
th~ Cr~wn or by competent legislative authority, and then only by specific
legislation.

U
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V. THE DOCTRINE OF COMMON LAW DISPOSSESSION
The theory of discontinuity occasionally assumes a somewhat different
form. This doctrine holds that in instances where English law is introduced
into a newly-acquired territory the local inhabitants are automatically
deprived of their existing land rights. This is thought to come about, not
because of the change of sovereignty itself (which is the theory considered
above), but because of the application of English law. The reasoning is as
follows. It is a fundamental principle of English law that the King is the
original proprietor and lord paramount of all lands within the realm, and
the sole source of title to the soil. The courts will only recognize private land
titles which can be shown to derive, directly or indirectly, from a Crown
grant. The local inhabitants of a newly-acquired territory normally cannot
show this, as their titles stem from ancient possession or other sources predating the advent of the Crown. Therefore, the doctrine contends, their
rights cannot be recognized in the courts of the new sovereign.
This viewpoint was expressed in the Australian case of Milirrpum v.
Nabalco Pty. Ltd. ,. 16 where Blackburn J. refers to "the principle, fundamental to the English law of real property, that the Crown is the source of
title to all land; that no subject can own land allodially, but only an estate or
interest in it which he holds mediately or immediately of the Crown." He
goes on to conclude: "On the foundation of New South Wales, therefore,
and of South Australia, every square inch of territory in the colony became
the property of the Crown. All titles, rights, and interests whatever in land
which existed thereafter in subjects of the Crown were the direct consequence of some grant from the Crown." Native Australian peoples were
therefore automatically deprived of their ancestral lands.
The argument rests on the premise that when English law replaces a
local legal system all rights held under the former system which do not conform to English law automatically cease. The land rights of the local inhabitants are said to be void, not because the Crown has nullified them, but
simply because they do not satisfy the requirements of English property
law. The premise, once stated in a general form, appears highly questionable. It can hardly be true, for example, that marriages validly contracted under the old local law would be automatically dissolved for failure
to conform to the new English rules governing place of marriage, parental

•• (1971), 17 F.L.R. 141 at 245 (Aust. N.T.S.C.).
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consent, number of witnesses, and so on. To take a case closer to home it
cannot easily be imagined that a person who had inherited lands under l~al
law prior to the changeover would now find himself disinherited in favour
of a third party by the retroactive operation of English rules of succession.
These examples concern rights which in their origins fail to satisfy the requirements of English law. Similar considerations govern rights whose
character and incidents are unknown to the Eng Mish system. Would a contract of a type not recognized in English law (moral questions apart) be
nullified upon the changeover? Again, would a right to moveable property
whose incidents are foreign to English concepts be rescinded ipso facto?
The true rule is that where English law is introduced mto a territory the
new system does not operate retroactively so as to nullify private rights held
under the former legal regime, at least if they do not present morally offensive features. The requirements of English law concerning the creation and
transfer of rights operate only for the future. It seems to follow that private
land rights held under local law will not be invalidated by the introduction
of English law, even though such rights may not conform, in character or
origins, to the new system. There is scope, then, for the courts to recognize
land rights held by local inhabitants which stem, not from a Crown grant,
but from sources pre-dating the introduction of English common law.
The issue arose in Quebec following the publication of the Royal Proclam~tion of October 1763. This provided, among other things, that the inhabitants of the newly-acquired province might confide in the Crown's protection "for the Enjoyment of the Benefit of the Laws of Our Realm of
England'', and that courts of justice would be erected to determine all
causes, both criminal and civil, "according to Law and Equity, and as near
as may be agreeable to the Laws of England". 11 The potential impact of this
provision upon the French inhabitants caused widespread consternation in
the province, and led eventually to the restoration of French law in civil
matters in the Quebec Act of 1774. What is interesting for our purposes is
the fact that the law officers of the Imperial Crown, called in at various
points to express their views on the effects of the Proclamation's provisions,
agreed that they should not be read as altering local property rights held
under French law.
The Attorney-General and Solicitor-General of England, Yorke and
De Grey, referred in their report of 1766 to the alarm and disorder
engendered in Quebec by certain interpretations put upon the Royal Proclamation of 1763.
As if it were his Royal Intentions . . . at once to abolish all the usages and
Customs of Canada, with the rough hand of a Conqueror rather than with
the true Spirit of a Lawful Sovereign, and not so much to extend the protection and Benefit of his English Laws to His new subjects, by securing
their Lives, Libertys and propertys with more certainty than in former

11

Brigham, supra, note 8, at 214.
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times, as to impose new, unnecessary and arbitrary Rules, especially in the
Titles to Land, and in the modes of Descent Alienation and Settlement,
which tend to confound and subvert rights, instead of supporting them.

The law officers went on to advise that in all actions relating to land it
would be oppressive to disturb without much deliberation the prevailing
French custom, for "to introduce at one Stroke the English Law of Real
Estates ... must occasion infinite confusion and Injustice". They thought
it might therefore be appropriate for the Governor of Quebec to issue an explanatory proclamation quieting the minds of the populace as to the true
meaning of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 regarding local customs and
usages, "more especially in Titles of Land and Cases of Real property." 18
A subsequent Attorney-General of England, Edward Thurlow, concurred with this view in a report on Quebec composed in 1773. He wrote:
The Canadians seem to have been strictly entitled by thejus gentium
to their property, as they possessed it upon the capitulation and treaty of
peace, together with all its qualities and incidents, by tenure or otherwise,
and also to their personal liberty; for both which they were to expect your
Majesty's gracious protection.
It seems a necessary consequence that all those laws by which that
property was created, defined, and secured must be continued to them. To
introduce any other, as Mr. Yorke and Mr. De Grey emphatically expressed it, tend to confound and subvert rights instead of supporting
them."

Rather than holding that English law nullified existing property rights,
the law officers reasoned that the continued presence of those rights
softened the impact of English law, which took effect subject to them and
not the contrary.
A similar attitude was exhibited by Justice Monk of the Quebec
Superior Court in the celebrated case of Connolly v. Woo/rich, 20 where he
considered the effect of English and French law on the rights and customs
of Indian peoples in the Hudson's Bay Company Territories and the old
North-West. Justice Monk was willing to assume, for purposes of argument, that the first European inhabitants in these areas carried with them
the law of their parent state as their birthright. However, he pointed out
that they took only so much of that law as was applicable to the condition

'"Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty, eds. Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada, 1759-1791, 2nd ed. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1918), I,
251 at 252, 255, 256; dated 14 April 1766.
19 Ibid., l, 437 at 443; dated 22 January 1773. See also the Report of the SolicitorGeneraI, Alex Wedderburn, of 6 December 1772, ibid., I, 424 at 430; and the
Report of the Advocate-General, James Marriott, published in 1774, ibid., I, 445
at 454, 471-72.
20
(1867), II L.C. Jur. 197 at 204-05 (Que. S.C.); also reported at 17 R.J.R.Q. 75.
The decision was upheld on appeal sub nom. Johnstone v. Connolly (1869), 17
R.J.R.Q. 266, I R.L.O.S. 253 (Que. Q.B.).
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of an infant colony. ''For the artificial refinements and distinctions incident
to the property of a great and commercial people, ... and a multitude of
other provisions, were neither necessary nor convenient for them, and
therefore not in force." In the Canadian North-West, the first settlers encountered numerous and powerful Indian tribes, who had long been in
possession of the country.
!'low, as I said before, even admitting, for the sake of argument, the existence . : . of the common law of France, and that of England, at these
two tradmg posts or establishments respectively, yet, will it be contended
that the territorial rights, political organization such as it was, or the laws
and usages of the Indian tribes, were abrogated..:..... that they ceased to exist
when these two European nations began to trade with the aboriginal occupants'? In my opinion, it is beyond controversy that they did not - that
so far from being abolished, they were left in full force, and were not even
modified in the slightest degree in regard to the civil rights of the natives.

Nevertheless, where English law is introduced into a country inhabited
by aboriginal peoples and becomes the dominant legal system, it becomes
necessary to harmonize native land rights with the common law in some
way. A number of questions arise. What rights and powers does the Crown
hold .regarding native lands? Does it possess some sort of underlying title?
Can 1t grant away lands held by the aboriginal peoples, and what is the legal
effect of such grants? Other issues arise regarding the relative rights of
settlers and native peoples. Are settlers free to occupy native lands? Can
they purchase them from the native owners and obtain good title? A
number of questions also exist regarding the rights of native peoples
themselves. What is the legal scope of their title? Does it extend to all
beneficial uses of the land? Is it tied to traditional uses? How does
aboriginal title pass from one generation to the next, and from one native
~rou~ to another? Finally, in what ways may aboriginal title properly be extmgmshed? The need to answer these and other related questions has given
rise to a distinct body of judicial principles known as the doctrine of
aboriginal title.
This doctrine has sprung not simply from the necessity of fitting
aboriginal land rights into the common law scheme, but also from the need
to make some legal sense of the often contradictory historical patterns of
Crown practice regarding aboriginal peoples, particularly in North
America. From an early date, far-reaching and often ill-defined claims were
advanced by the British Crown to American territories, prior to any actual
control being achieved, or the territories even being explored. These claims
originally had little or no basis in fact. They were not recognized by the indigenous nations and bands actually occupying the regions claimed. They
often conflicted with equally extravagant claims advanced by rival European powers. They were of questionable legitimacy under international Iaw.
In most cases, the Crown gained control of territories claimed only after a
considerable lapse of time, as much as three centuries in certain instances.
Du:ing the intervening period, there was a good deal of conflicting practice,
which defies easy summary. On the one hand the Crown granted Charters
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covering vast territories to various proprietary and corporate bodies, with
no explicit reservation for Indian rights, at a time when most of the lands
were under Indian occupation. On the other hand the Crown generally, if
not always, sought to maintain friendly relations with the Indian nations
bordering on the settled areas, and often attempted to prevent intrusion on
Indian lands. At the same time it entered into numerous treaties with native
peoples, which frequently attributed to them a quasi-autonomous status, as
protected nations or allies of the Crown. Finally, in most British colonies
Indian lands were purchased by the government prior to being granted out,
and private purchases of such lands were prohibited. How can these facts be
reconciled? The effort to do so leads to the doctrine of aboriginal title,
which we will now consider.
A large number of cases might be invoked in any comprehensive
discussion of this doctrine. My aim here is more modest: to examine in
detail several early decisions which first expounded the doctrine of
aboriginal land rights in a developed form, and which have had a substantial influence on subsequent case-law in the United States and Commonwealth countries. The cases to be reviewed are two decisions of the
United States Supreme Court handed down in the early nineteenth century,
and a decision of the New Zealand Supreme Court of slightly later vintage. I
will examine the American decisions first.

VI. THE DOCTRINE OF ABORIGINAL TITLE
(JOHNSON v. M'INTOSH)
John Marshall was Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court
when it decided the cases of Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh
(1823) and Worcester v. State of Georgia (1832). 21 Chief Justice Marshall
wrote the majority decisions in both cases and brought to his task an intimate knowledge of early American history and a familiarity with the
questi~n of. Indian title. 22 His reasoning in Worcester follows general lines
estabhshed m the earlier case, with certain significant differences. It will be
con~~nient here to focus on the Johnson case, referring to Worce;ter for
clanf1cation and amplification. 23
In Johnson v. M'lntosh, the plaintiffs laid claim to certain lands in the
s~a~e of Illinois. T~ey asserted title under conveyances made to private indmduals by the chiefs of the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians in 1773 and
24
1775. At the period of purchase, the lands fell within the asserted boundaries of the British colony of Virginia, which claimed jurisdiction over extensive western areas under its original Crown Charters, claims later surrendered to the United States government after the American Revolution.

2
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8 Wheaton 543 (U.S.S.C.); 6 Peters 515 (U.S.S.C.).
Marshall was the author of a five volume biography of George Washington,
which featured a lengthy historical introduction reviewing the genesis of the
British colonies in America; John Marshall, The Life of George Washington, l st
ed., 5 vols. (Philadelphia: C.P. Wayne, 1804-07). For biographical details regarding Marshall's previous exposure to questions of Indian title, see L..J. Priestley,
"Communal Native Title and the Common Law: Further Thoughts on the Gove
Land Rights Case" (1974), 6 Federal Law Review 150 at 170-71.
1l Useful discussions of these cases can be found in Howard R. Berman, "The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the United States" (1978),
27 Buffalo Law Review 637, and J. Youngblood Henderson, "Unraveling the
Riddle of Aboriginal Title" (1977), 5 American Indian Law Review 75.
2
• For a review of these transactions, see Lawrence H. Gipson, The British Empire
before the American Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1936-70), XI,
489-91.
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The same Indian peoples subsequently ceded the lands in question by public
treaty to the American government, which in turn granted them to the
defendant. The question was whether the plaintiff's title, acquired directly
from the Indians, prevailed over the defendant's title, derived from the
United States government. This in turn raised the question of the relationship between Indian title and the English-derived land system in force in the
American colonies, later the United States.
The court's decision is best appreciated in the light of the arguments
advanced by counsel, which I now turn to.
A. The Submissions of CounseP 5
Leading off, the plaintiffs attempted to short-circuit any discussion of
the nature of Indian title. They contended that nearly all American lands
were held under Indian purchases, public and private. In the case at hand,
both the plaintiffs' predecessors and later the United States had secured
Indian cessions of the disputed lands. Therefore both parties ultimately
claimed by virtue of the same root of title. The only question was whether
private individuals were competent to make such purchases. 26
While it was thus unnecessary and speculative to discuss what sort of
title the Indians held to their lands, the plaintiffs ventured the opinion that
probably "their title by occupancy is to be respected, as much as that of an
individual, obtained by the same right, in a civilized state''. 27 The fact that
Indians held lands in common did not impair the strength of their title by
occupancy. The plaintiffs referred to the Treaties of Utrecht and Aix la
Chapelle as recognizing a right of soil in the Indians. At Utrecht in 1713,
Britain and France agreed on the following Article:
The inhabitants of Canada and other subjects of France shall hereafter
give no molestation to the Five Nations or cantons of Indians subject to
the dominion of Great Britain [i.e. the Iroquois nations], or to the other
nations of America who are friends of the British Crown. In like manner,

" The following discussion is based on the abbreviated account of counsel's
arguments found in the law reports. Unfortunately no complete version of the
pleadings of counsel appears to have survived, as an inquiry to the United States
Supreme Court Library has confirmed. I am indebted to Prof. Balfour J. Halevy,
Librarian of the Osgoode Hall Law School, for his generous assistance on this
point.
2
' 8 Wheaton 543 at 562-63.
21
Ibid., at 563.
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the subjects of Great Britain shall behave peaceably towards native
Americans who are subjects or friends of France: and both groups shall
enjoy full liberty of going and coming on account of trade .... 28

This stipulation was confirmed in 1748 by the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle as
part of a general renewal of the Utrecht provisions. 29
While the Treaty does not recognize Indian land rights in explicit
terms, it prohibits efforts on either side to dispossess Indians connected
with the other party, which presumes Indian entitlement to their territories.
The Treaty also distinguishes between lndians who are European subjects
and those who are merely allies, thus apparently attributing an independent
status to the latter.
The plaintiffs went on to cite the remarks made by Chief Justice
Marshall in the Supreme Court decision in Fletcher v. Peck (1810), 30 where,
speaking for the majority, he said:
It was doubted whether a state can be seized in fee oflands, subject to the

Indian title, and whether a decision that they were seized in fee, might not
be construed to amount to a decision that their grantee might maintain an
ejectment for them, notwithstanding that title.
The majority of the court is of opinion that the nature of the Indian
title, which is certainly to be respected by all courts, until it be legitimately
extinguished, is not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seizin in fee on
the part of the state.

The court recognizes Indian title as a legal right forming a burden on the
underlying fee of the state; as such, it is entitled to respect by the courts until extinguished. Marshall does not indicate whether that title might validly
be alienated to a private individual.

" My own translation of the original French text,. adapting the translation given in
Charles Jenkinson, ed., A Collection of All the Treaties of Peace, Alliance, and
Commerce, between Great-Britain and Other Powers ... (London: J. Debrett,

2
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1785), Vol. II, 5 at 36-37. The original French article reads as follows: "Les
habitans du Canada et autres sujets de la France ne molesteront point a l'avenir
!es Cinq Nations ou cantons des Indiens soumis a la Grande Bretagne, ny Jes
autres nations de I' Amerique amies de eette eouronne. Pareillement Jes sujets de
la Grande Bretagne se comporteront pacifiquement envers les Americains sujets
ou amis de la France, et Jes uns et !es autres joiiiront d'une pleine liberte de se
frequenter pour le bien de commerce, ... "; text in Frances G. Davenport, ed.,
European Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States and Its Dependencies . .. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917-37), Ill,
l93 at 213. As to the authority of the French text, see Clive Parry, ed., The Consolidated Treaty Series (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1969- ),
XXVII, 475.
Article III: text in Parry, supra, note 28, XXXVIII, 297 at 305-06; Jenkinson,
supra, note 28, 370 at 374.
6 Cranch 87 at 142-43 (U .S.S.C.).
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It is a matter of interest that Justice Johnson, in a strong separate
opinion in the same case, denied that a state could be seized in fee simple of
lands subject to Indian title. The right of the state in such an instance was
"nothing more than what was assumed at the first settlement of the
country, to wit, a right of conquest or of purchase, exclusively of all competitors within certain defined limits." 31 This amounted to a mere preemptive right to acquire the fee simply by purchase when the Indian proprietors were willing to sell. It may be noted that Johnson's view, while
favourable to Indian title, was distinctly inamicable to the plaintiffs' claim,
because it attributed to the government an exclusive power to extinguish
Indian title, and thus implicitly ruled out private purchases.
Counsel also referred to the decision of the New York Supreme Court
in Jackson v. Wood (1810), 32 where Chancellor Kent observed: "It is a fact
too notorious to admit of discussion or to require proof, that the Oneida Indians still reside within this state, as a distinct and independent tribe, and
upon lands which they have never alienated, but hold and enjoy as the
original proprietors of the soil." This conclusion was not affected by the
fact, which Kent noted, that "indians generally hold their lands in common,
and do not know of individual property in land."
Having mounted these authorities favouring the existence of Indian
title, the plaintiffs proceeded to·argue that this title could be transferred to
private individuals, in the absence of any legislation to the contrary. At the
time the conveyances in question were executed, they contended, there were
no valid enactments in Virginia forbidding such transactions. Therefore the
conveyances were good. To sustain this point, the plaintiffs had to
distinguish several specific pieces of legislation, notably the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and a Virginia statute of 1779. Their detailed submissions
on this subject will be considered later.
In reply, the defendants presented a comprehensive range of
arguments, which attempt to cover all possible sources of law on the subject, including the law of nations, natural law, Indian custom, British
colonial law, English land law, Virginia statutes, and Crown legislation.
Invoking the law of nations, the defendants asserted that "the uniform
understanding and practice of European nations, and the settled law, as laid
down by the tribunals of civilized states, denied the right of the Indians to
be considered as independent communities, having a permanent property in
the soil, capable of alienation to private individuals." 13 The Indians, it was
asserted, remained in a state of nature, and had never been admitted into
the society of nations. Indeed the whole theory of European title to lands in
America rested upon the hypothesis that the Indians had no right of soil as
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sovereign, independent states. "Discovery is the foundation of title in
European nations, and this overlooks all proprietary rights in 'the
34
natives. " This argument, it may be noted, is similar to the doctrine of a
legal vacuum, discussed earlier.
The defendants also presented a parallel argument based on natural
la~. By the law of nature, it was contended, the amount of land we can acqmre by occupancy is limited by our capacity to use it to supply our wants.
We cannot exclude other people from lands which they need and which we
ourselves cannot use. "Upon this principle the North American Indians
co~ld have acquired no proprietary interest in the vast tracts of territory
which they wande~ed over; and their right to the lands on which they hunted
c~m~d n?t .be cons1de~edi as superior to that which is acquired to the sea by
f1shu~g m it. The use m the one case, as well as the other, is not exclusive. "JS
In bnef, the lands occupied by the Indians were not used by them in such a
ma~ner "as to prevent their being appropriated by a people of
cult1vators."H
This argument, it may be noted, combines two distinct lines of
thought. The first asserts that we cannot arrogate for ourselves more land
than_ we actuall.y need and make use of. This point, even if valid, is not
particularly tellmg against Indian title as such, because there could be no
doubt that the Indian~ made use of at least part of the land they claimed,
and depended upon 1t for sustenance. At most the principle might be
em~loyed to narrow the bounds of Indian territories, not to eliminate them
e~ttrely. The second line of argument appears to assert something quite
different, namely that cultivators of the soil are entitled to oust those who
use the la1:1d only for h~nting and gathering. 37 This proposition raises ageold and highly contentmus questions about the relative rights of farmers
~e.rders~ hunters and miners. Although one might agree in the abstract that
it ts desirable that land should be put to its most productive use, it seems extreme to conclude that people who use land to less than its full potential
thereby forfeit any title to it.
The defendants went on to present an alternative agrument designed to
meet these sorts of objections. They were prepared to accept, for the sake of
argument, that the Indian nations constituted independent states and as
such held ~itle to their territories. But if this were true, contended the defen~ants, It followed that when the plaintiffs purchased land from the
Indians, they took their title as Indian subjects and according to Indian con~epts of property. But the Indians never had any idea of individual property
m land. Further, the lands conveyed to the plaintiffs were never severed
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Ibid., at 147.
7 Johnson's Reports 290 at 295 (N.Y.S.C.).
" 8 Wheaton 543 at 567.
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Ibid. , at 567.
Ibid. , at 569-70.
Ibid. , at 570.
Of .course as a matter of fact many North American Indian peoples practiced
agriculture as well.
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from Indian dominion, "because the grantees could not take the sovi:;reignty and eminent domain to themselves. " 38 T~~refore, the ~efendants imply,
the plaintiffs could stand in no higher a pos1Uon than ordn1:ary ?1embers of
the tribe, whose particular right~ to use tribal lands were extmgmshed by the
general cession made to the Umted States.
A fourth argument presented by the defendant.s dr~ws upon b?th
British colonial law and English common law as received m the colomes.
The title of. the Crown to American territories, they contended, passe.d to
the colonists by Royal Charters, which were ~bsolute grants ?f the soil. It
was a "first principle in colonial law that all titles must be derived from the
crown. "'9 By "colonial law", counsel see~ingly ?1eans ~he basic set of legal
principles governing the colonies and their relatmns With the er.own. The
reasoning is that the royal practice o~ gran~ing C:ha~t~rs to Amencan l.a~ds
presupposed a legal principle preventmg private md1v1duals fr.om .obtammg
lands in the colonies on their own account. The same conclusion is rea~he?
by a slightly different route. Counsel noted that in mo~t of the colo~1es it
was accepted that the settlers brought with them the nghts and duties of
Englishmen, and particularly the laws of prope~ty,. so far as. these were
suitable. English property law enshrined the pnnc1ple t.ha! title to land
derives exclusively from the Crown. Therefore the plamtiffs could not
•
derive title from the Indians. 40
The argument, we may remark, recalls the. d?ctrine of common law dispossession considered earlier. Here, however, 1t ~s employed not so much to
deny land rights to the Indians as to negate the nght.of a ~ettler to purchase
land from the Indians, a point which has more ment. If mde~d the settlers
are governed by English property law, as distinct from the Indians who ho~d
land on a different basis, then it arguably follows that settlers can obtam
title to property only by virtue of c:own grant: .
Defendants also cited various pieces of legislation. ~s early ~s 1662, a
Virginia Act forbade private land purchases from the lnd1~ns. T~is .st.atute,
defendant observed had apparently never been repealed. A Virg1ma Act
of 1779 states that' no person has or ever had a right to purchase lan~s
within the limits of Virginia from any Indian nation except on the pubhc

" 8 Wheaton 543 at 568.
9
'
Ibid., at 570.
0
•
Ibid., at 570-71.
.
62
· l d "C
• • The statute cited appears to be Act 138 of the session for I ~61- . , enllt e
oncerning Indians". This provides that for the f~tur~ no Indian km~ or other shall
upon any pretence alienate or sell, nor any Enghshman pur~hase, an!' tract ?f
land justly claimed or actually possessed by any Indians, on pam of nulhty; text m
William w. Hening, ed., The Statutes at Larife;. Being. a Collection of_ All th~
Laws of Virginia from . .. the Year 1619 (Facs1m1le repnnt, Charlotte~v1lle, Va ..
University Press of Virginia, 1969; derived from 1st and 2nd eds., various places
and publishers, 1819-23), II, 138 at 139.
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account, and that all such private purchases, past and future, are utterly
void. 42 The latter statute, it may be remarked, post-dated the two purchases
in question here, which took place in 1773 and 1775. However the Act purports to govern past as well as future transactions.
On this point, counsel for the other side contended that the Act of 1779
could not affect rights already existing at the time of passage, invoking the
Virginia constitution and general principles. Moreover the Act was apparently repealed in 1794, not having been included in the revisal of that year.
The repeal, they argued, reinstated any rights affected by the Act. As for
the legislation of 1662, the plaintiffs asserted that the old Virginia Acts
governing Indian purchases had all been repealed before the relevant
period.• 3
The defendants went on to refer to the Royal Proclamation of 1763
which explicitly prohibited private persons from making any purchases of
Indian lands in the American colonies. 44 Counsel for the other side contended that the Proclamation was invalid in this respect, arguing that the
Crown had no prerogative power to legislate for a colony once a local
legislative assembly existed, as had long been the case in Virginia. 45 Since
the Proclamation was a prerogative act and not an Act of Parliament, it was
void in Virginia. The authority cited was the famous English decision in
Campbell v. Hall (1774). 46 Lord Mansfield held there that when the Crown
acquiredl a territory by conquest or cession, it initially could legislate for the
country under the prerogative, apart from Parliament; however this power
was lost once a local assembly was granted to the colony. The defendants
countered this reasoning with a pair of alternative arguments. •1 The territory in question was acquired by the Crown either under the Treaty vf
Paris in 1763, or at an earlier period when Virginia was founded. On the
first premise, the Indian inhabitants of the territory fell under the Crown's
sovereignty in 1763, as the inhabitants of a conquered and ceded country,
and so, under the rule in Campbell v. Hall, the Crown could legislate for
them under the prerogative. Insofar as the Proclamation restricted the right
of Indians to sell their lands to settlers, it was valid because the Indians (if
not the settlers) could be viewed as a conquered people. In the alternative, if
the area in question was not gained by cession in 1763 but had always been
part of the colony of Virginia, then the Proclamation was a valid exercise of
the royal power to prescribe the limits within which grants of land and

" 8 Wheaton 543 at 569; the 1779 statute is given at 565, note 5.
" Ibid., at 565-66. Unfortunately no references are given for the supposed repealing
legislation.
•• Ibid. , at 57 l.
" Ibid., at 564-65.
•• I Cowp. 204; 98 E.R. 1045 (K.B.).
" 8 Wheaton 543 at 571.
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settlements could be made in a colony. This power entailed the authority to
48
control private purchases of Indian lands.
B.

lized nations", yet if it is indispensable to the system under which the
country has been settled, it "certainly cannot be rejected by courts of
justice" .s• Elsewhere he remarks:
We will not enter into the controversy, whether agriculturists, merchants,
and manufacturers, have a right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters
fr~m the _territory they possess, or to contract their limits. Conquest gives
a title which the courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private
and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original
justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted. ' 2

The Decision

Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the unanimous op1mon of the
Supreme Court, rejected the plaintiff's claim to der~v7 title from t.he
Indians. Three distinct grounds were given for the dec1s1on. It was said,
firstly, that the uniform practice of both Great Britain and the Uni~ed
States, its successor, rested on the premise that the state had the exclus~ve
power to grant title to lands in America. Such title was subject to the Indian
right of occupancy· but the Indian right was extinguishable only by surrender to the state ~nd could not be transferred to private individuals. The
second ground w~s somewhat different. It held that w.hatever ri~hts the
plaintiffs acquired from the Indians were held under Indian prote~tton and
subject to their laws. If the Indians chose to a~nul those nghts, ~o
American court could interfere. The fact that the Indians ceded the lands m
question to the United States without any reservation of the plaintiffs'
rights indicated that they considered those rights invalid. The final reason
given by the court was that private purchases of Indian lands were prohibited by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which was still in force when the
transfers took place.

1. The argument from uniform state practice
Marshall begins by stating that the basic issue is whether th~ Indiai:is
have the power to give to private individuals a title to land sustamable m
American courts. 49 He emphasizes that the question is at root one of
American law. rather than natural law or international law. Title to lands
depends "entirely on the law of the nation in w~ic~ they lie". A co~rt, .he
affirms, is bound to follow not simply those prmc1ples of abstract Justice
which God has impressed on man's mind and which regulate the rights of
civilized nations, but also and more particularly those rules "which our own
government has adopted in the particular case, and given us as the rule for
our decision". so Marshall acknowledges here a certain tension between
domestic American law and principles of natural law and international law,
and leaves no doubt as to which must prevail in American courts in case of
conflict. This order of precedence is clearly indicated in a later passage,
where Marshall observes that, however much a restriction on alienation of
Indian lands "may be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civi-

••For a detailed consideration of the validity of the Royal Proclamation of 1763,
see Slattery, Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, supra, note 4, at
283-302.

•• 8 Wheaton 543 at 572.
so Ibid.
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The Chief Justice thus downplays the relevance of defendants' submissions
on these points, and evidently makes every reservation as to their correctness in point of principle.
The governing law, then, is that of the United States. Marshall holds,
however, that American law on this subject is founded on the law enforced
by Great Britain in its American colonies prior to the Revolution. This in
turn he characterizes as consonant with the rules originally recognized
among ~uropean colonial powers as governing their behaviour in the New
World. H~ thus begins his analysis with an historical survey of the practice
of the major European powers, and then proceeds with an examination of
British and finally American practice regarding Indian lands.
From the early days of American discovery and exploration, relates
Marshall, the great states of Europe were driven by a thirst for new territories. In order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war, it was
necessary for them to establish a principle which all should acknowledge as
the law by which the right of acquisition should be regulated as among
themselves. The principle which they adopted was this. Discovery of a
country gave title against all other European governments, which title might
be perf~c~ed by po~session. The discovering nation had the exclusive right
of acqmrmg the soil from the native peoples and establishing settlements.
No other European state might interfere. 53
This principle, Marshall indicates, was not part of the universal law of
nations. It applied only among European states subscribing to it so as to
reg~late their rights inter se. It could not in itself affect the rights of the
native occupants of America. As Marshall explains in Worcester v.
Georgia,
it was an exclusive principle which shut out the right of competition
a_mong those who had agreed to it; not one which could annul the previous
n?hts of those who had not agreed to it. It regulated the right given by
discovery among the European discoverers, but could not affect the rights
of those alrea~y in possession, either as aboriginal occupants, or as
occupants by v1rtue of a discovery made before the memory of man.,.

''
"
"
,.

Ibid., at 591-92.
Ibid. , at 588.
Ibid., at 573.
6 Peters SIS at 544.
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then:s~lves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate
donumon, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives.
The.se grants have been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees
sub1ect only to the Indian right of occupancy."
'

The Chief Justice was aware of the difficulty of applying the principle of
discovery to lands which were already inhabited, and for that reason denies
it the stature of a universal law among nations. He puts the matter this way:
It is difficult to comprehend the proposition that the inhabitants of either
quarter of the globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over
the inhabitants of the other, or over the lands they occupied; or that the
discovery of either by the other should give the discoverer rights in the
country discovered which annulled the pre-existing rights of its ancient
possessers."

The significance of the principle of discovery, in Marshall's view, is the
exclusivity of the rights which it conferred, the fact that the discovering
European state had sole rights, as among European powers, of entering into
relations with the natives of the country discovered, and of acquiring land
from them. He seems to imply that this exclusive right of acquisition
operated not only as against other European states but also as against the
subjects of the discovering state, so that the Crown or government alone
could purchase Indian title, and not private individuals - a point of obvious relevance to the issue before the court.
It is important to note that according to the Chief Justice the principle
of discovery said nothing as to how the incoming European state should
deal with the native inhabitants. How far the Indians were to retain their
original independence, governmental structures, customary laws and land
rights would depend on the links actually established between a European
state and particular Indian nations. "Those relations which were to exist
between the discoverer and the natives, were to be regulated by
themselves". 56 It follows that the nature of such relationships might be expected to vary somewhat from European state to European state, and
perhaps from one Indian nation to another.
Nevertheless Marshall hazards a generalization about European state
practice as a whole, which is worth quoting at length:
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily,
to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful
occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession
of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to
complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle that
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the
natives, as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in

" Ibid., at 542-43.
,. 8 Wheaton 543 at 573.
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argume~t, ~s that the ~uropean powers generally
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to understand Marshall's
claimed the right to grant
lands w1thm t?e terntories discovered, even while the Indians were in
factual possess10n, and before any cession or surrender had been secured
fror;i the.m. Such grants, he states, were thought to convey title subject to an
Indian nght of occupancy.
Mars~~ll contends that the history of North America proves the universal recogm~10n of these principles among the colonizing states, and he goes
on to review the ,st.ate practice of Spain, Portugal, France, Holland,
England an~ t~e Umted States. The evidence adduced regarding the first
fo~: countn~s IS. meagre,. and it appe~rs that Marshall draws mainly on
Bn~1sh practice m Amenca, as reaffirmed and carried forward by the
~mted States .. 58 This observation applies less, perhaps, to the principle of
discovery, ~hich rests upon the supposed unanimous recognition of Europea~ colomal powers, than to the legal relations established between an incomm~ Europ_ea~ sovereign and native Americans. It seems fair to say that
the C~1ef J usttc.e. s analysis of the latter subject is based largely on his interpr~tat1on of British and United States law and practice, and owes little to
evidence drawn from the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and French colonies
.. Marshall revie":'s some of the major American charters issued by th~
Bnt1sh Cro"'.n, rangmg from the Commission granted to the Cabots in 1496
to t~e Carohna Charters of the 1660's. He draws from this survey the conclu~1on ~h~t the whole country has, in stages, been granted by the Crown
whde still m the possession of the Indians. The grants, he notes, generally
purport to convey not only the right of dominion but also the soil itself. In
a~l of the areas affected, the ~and ~a~ at the time of grant occupied by Indians. Yet ali_n?st every land title w1thm those areas derives in some manner
from the ong11!al Crown grants. It has never been objected, Marshall
observes, that title as wel~ as possession was in the Indians, and that the
Crown ~rants passed no~~mg on that account. The various Charters cannot
be considered mere nulhttes. 59
.Under the treaty which concluded the Revolutionary War, Marshall
co?ti?ues, the governmel?tal powers and title to the soil formerly vested in
~ntam passe~ to the United States. It has not hitherto been doubted that
either t~e ~mted St~tes .or the individual states had a clear title to all the
lands w1thm the terntones tra~sferred, subject only to the Indian right of
occupancy, and that the exclusive power to extinguish that right was vested

" Ibid., at 574.
" Ibid., at 574-87.
,. Ibid., at 579-80.
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in the government. 60 The Chief Justice reviews certa~n historical e~ide.nce
supporting this observation and concludes that the Umted St~tes ~amtams,
as did the colonial powers, "that discovery gave an exclusive nght to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest;
and gave also a right to such a degree of sovereignty as the circumstances of
the people would allow them to exercise". 6 '
Marshall now comes to the nub of his argument. The validity of the
land titles conferred by the British Crown and its successor, the United
States, had never been questioned in the courts. The power to grant title has
been exercised uniformly over territory in Indian possession. ''The existence
of this power'', he concludes, "must negative the existence of any right
which may conflict with, and control it. An absolute tit!e t~ lands
cannot exist, at the same time, in different persons, or m. different
governments .... All our institutions recognize the absolute titl~ of the
crown, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy; and recognized the
absolute title of the crown to extinguish that right. This is incompatible with
an absolute and complete title in the Indians. " 62
The Chief Justice holds in effect that the notion that private parties can
acquire title by direct purchase from the Indians is irreconcilable with the
uniform claims of the British Crown and the United States to exclusive
powers of disposition over American lands. These powers rest on the principle that, so far as settlers are concerned, the Crown is the sole so?rce .of
title and so far as Indians are concerned, the Crown alone can extmgmsh
thei; right of occupancy. On either count, the claim of the plaintiffs fails.
2. The argument from Indian jurisdiction

We will now consider a second and quite distinct line of reasoning
which is advanced by the court. Marshall frames this argument as follows:
The title of the crown, whatever it might be, could be acquired only by a
conveyance from the crown. If an individual might extinguish the Indian
title for his own benefit, or, in other words, might purchase it, still he
could acquire only that title. Admitting their [the Indians'] power to
change their laws or usages, so far as to allow an individual to separate a
portion of their lands from the common stock, and hold it in se~eralty,
still it is a part of their territory, and is held under them, by a title dependent on their laws. The grant derives its efficacy from their will; and, if
they choose to resume it, and make a different disposition of the land, the
courts of the United States cannot interpose for the protection of the title.
The person who purchases lands frOJll the Indians, within their territory,
incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the property purchased;
holds their title under their protection, and subject to their laws. If they

•• Ibid., at 584-85.
" Ibid., at 587.
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annul the grant,
we know of no tribunal which can revise and set aside the
proceeding.• 3

. In the present instance, relates Marshall, war broke out between 'the
Umted States and the Indian nations after the private conveyances had been
e.ffected. Treaties were later concluded whereby the Indians ceded their ent~re country to the United States without any reservation of the plaintiffs'
title. The absence of such a reservation, coupled with the fact that the Indians had continued to use the deeded lands in common with their other
lands, suggests that the Indians did not consider the conveyances valid. 04
The question arises how far this argument is compatible with
Marshall's first argument, or intended to be. On one view the two
a.rguments are logicaJly inconsistent, and are presented as alternatives. The
f1:st argume~t treats the Crown as ultimate sovereign and owner of the soil,
with the Indians .holding a right of occupancy. The second, by contrast,
accords the Indians an autonomous or quasi-independent status and
recognizes their sovereign ability to dispose of their lands according to their
own laws.
Despit~ these differences, it appears the arguments can be reconciled.
The court m effect recognizes that the situation under consideration is
governe~ simultan.eously by two distinct legal regimes, Anglo-American
and Indian. The first argument approaches the question from within the
~ontext of Anglo-~~erican law. It maintains that the land system operating
m s~ttler commumt1es rests on the premise that the Crown is the sole source
of title, so that settlers are incapable of deriving from the Indians a title to
land recognizable in American law. However, this reasoning does not exten~ to ~he Indians, whose title to the soil by occupancy, and whose transactions .mte~ se are not affected. Enter the second argument, which looks to
the Indian side of the matter. It holds that the rules in force in settler commu~ities do n~t d~rcctly apply to Indian peoples living independent lives in
their own terntones under their own laws. Just as an Indian nation may
~resumedly confer ex~lusive land rights on particular members of the group
(tf ~he la~s of the nation allow this), so also it is conceivable that an Indian
nat10n might grant land to individual outsiders. In such a case, maintains
the court, the outsider assimilates himself with the Indians and holds his
lands subject to their authority and under their laws. If the' Indians subsequently su~ren?er their lands to .the government so as to extinguish not only
the collective title of the gr?up itself, but also any particular rights held by
group i:nembers, then the nghts of the outsider are nullified as well, for he
stands m no higher a position than any other member of the group.

•• Ibid., at 593.
•• Ibid., at 593-94.
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3. The argument from the Royal Proclamation of 1763
The final reason given by the court for rejecting the plaintiff's claim is
the most straightforward of the three presented. As seen earlier, in October
1763 the British Crown issued a Proclamation governing its North
American dominions, which among other things reserves certain lands west
of the Atlantic watershed for Indian use, and explicitly prohibits private
persons from purchasing Indian lands. The Proclamation applied to the
lands in dispute and was still in force in 1773 and 1775 when the purchases
were effected. If it was valid and binding, then those purchases were void.
The plaintiffs sought to avoid this conclusion by contending that the Crown
did not have the power, in its prerogative, to forbid such transactions. Marshall rejected this argument and upheld the Proclamation.
He notes firstly that under British constitutional law all vacant lands
within the realm are vested in the Crown, which has the power to grant them
under the royal prerogative. This same principle was applied in America,
with the difference that while title was admitted to lie with the Crown, the
Indians were recognized to hold rights of occupancy. "The lands, then, to
which this proclamation referred, were lands which the King had a right to
grant, or to reserve for the Indians. " 65
The second justification furnished for the Proclamation has considerable theoretical interest. The British Crown, notes Marshall, holds extensive prerogative powers under the constitution regarding political relations with foreign nations, notably the authority to make war and peace and
to conclude treaties. He refers to the anomalous situation of the American
Indians, "necessarily considered in some respects, as a dependent, and in
some respects as a distinct people, occupying a country claimed by Great
Britain, and yet too powerful and brave not to be dreaded as formidable
enemies ... ''. 66 In short, the Indians were in some respects subject nations
(at least in theory), and in other respects sovereign or quasi-sovereign entities. To the extent that the Indians preserved their distinct status, implies
Marshall, the Crown retained toward them certain of the powers held vis-avis foreign nations, in particular the power to secure Indian friendship by
restraining the encroachment of whites on their lands. The Crown's
authority to do this, affirms the court, was never denied by the colonies,
and the Proclamation's provisions are valid as an exercise of that
authority. 67
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C. The Legal Character and Scope of Indian Title
.
W~at the.n is the precise legal nature of the Indian right of occupancy,
m particu~ar its relations~ip to the underlying title vested in the Crown?
From ;anous refer:nces it may be inferred that Marshall envisages four
st(.lges ii: the e~olut1on of the Crown's rights to Indian lands. The initial
sta~e ex1ste~ pnor !o the European discovery of North America, when the
v~10us !nd1an nations and bands were sovereign and independent units
with theu own laws and political structures, possessing full dominion over
the lands which they occupied. Marshall does not subscribe to the theory
that N.orth America, upon European discovery, was terra nullius, land
belonging to no one. As he states in Worcester v. Georgia:
~m~rica, separat7~ from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a
d1stmct people, d!Vlded into separate nations, independent of each other
~nd of the rest of the world, having institutions of their own, and govern.
mg themselves by their own laws. 61

He remarks that it is difficult to understand how the inhabitants of Europe
could.have had rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of
Amen~a or the lands they occupied, intimating that both dominion and title
were, m the pre-European era at least, vested in native Americans.
The sec~:>nd stage arises, acc.ording to Marshall, upon the European
voyage~ of discovery and exploration. Under a principle quickly adopted by
the :naJ~r Europ~an powers, the state first discovering a country held exclu~1ve .nght~ agamst other European states to enter into relations with the
native mhab1~ants of.th~ country.' and to gain the soil by whatever means
were appropriate. This right of discovery was held against other European
s~ates but n~t the Indian peoples, who had not subscribed to it, and whose
ng.h~s were m no way affected. Acting under the right of discovery the
Bnt1sh Crown ~nd the other colonizing powers issued Charters confe;ring
go.vernmental nghts a~d title.to the soil to various groups and individuals,
pnor to actual pos.sess1on be~ng taken of the lands in question, and while
those lands were sttll held by mdependent Indian groups. The Charters had
force as ~etwe~~ the Crown and its grantees, and conferred rights enforcea~Ie m Bntish courts against other British subjects. They also took
effect, m theory, vis-a-vis other European states (at least to the extent that
they were ba~ked by a right of discovery), but no method for securing enforc~ment existed beyond diplomatic negotiations or war. Marshall appears
to thmk that the Charters had no effect as regards the Indians at this stage
because the <:rown c~uld grant no more than it possessed. and thus far i~
held on!y ~ ng~t of discovery good against other European nations.
. This situation changed as the Crown, its agents and grantees, graduauy
gamed a measure of control over Indian nations encountered in the course

•• 6 Peters 515 at 542.
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of settlement and trade. This control was secured by force of arms or treaty,
and Indian peoples generally became dependent nations living under the
Crown's overall sovereignty. This third stage in the process gave the Crown
rights which were directly enforceable against the Indians, and correspondingly affected Indian sovereignty and land rights. The move from the
second to the third stage Marshall views as the conversion of a right of
discovery into a right of conquest, 69 or as he puts it elsewhere, the transformation of a merely dormant right against the native peoples into an actual
one. 10
The Crown at this third stage held what Marshall describes as a "complete ultimate title" to the soil, subject to an Indian right of possession
which the Crown alone could acquire. 11 The Crown's title originated, on
Marshall's view, with the right of discovery, but at that point it was held exclusively vis-a-vis other European states; the title became operative against
Indian nations only when they became subject to the Crown's overall
sovereignty.
What, then, is the legal character of Indian land rights at stage three?
Clearly native title is capable of coexisting with the ultimate title of the
Crown, upon which it forms a burden. Moreover it is a title cognizable by
the courts,. that is a "legal" right, and not one dependent merely on policy
or considerations of justice. The Indians, affirms Marshall, •'were admitted
to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to
retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion";
nevertheless their power to dispose of it freely was now limited to a right of
alienation to the Crown. 72 Earlier, in Fletcher v. Peck (1810), the Chief
Justice had stated that the Indian title "is certainly to be respected by all
courts, until it be legitimately extinguished", but is "not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seizin in fee on the part of the state". 73 Marshall reaffirms that view in Johnson v. M'Intosh, and he goes on to comment that
the Indian right of occupancy "is no more incompatible with a seisin in fee
than a lease for years, and might as effectually bar an ejectment". 74 The Indian title is not only cognizable by the courts, but enforceable against a party claiming under the Crown's ultimate title. The reason is that grants from
the Crown "convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of
occupancy. " 75 So long as the right of occupancy exists, the Indians have full
beneficial use of the land, the right "to use it according to their own discretion''. 1 •
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Marshal! dis:usses the overall position of Indian nations in stage three
at several pomts m Worcester v. Georgia. He states, in a famous passage,
tha! .the Indian nations had always been viewed as "distinct, independent
P?htlcal communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisput7d possessors of the soil from time immemorial'', with the exception
of the imposed restriction against relations with any European nation other
than the first discoverer . 17 He asserts that history furnishes no example
from the time of first settlement, of any attempt on the Crown's part to in~
terfere ~ith the internal affairs of the Indians, except to keep out the agents
of foreign powers. 78 The typical Indian group in contact with the British,
nevertheless, became over time dependent on the Crown for the supply of
necessary goods, and for protection from lawless intrusions into its
country. H These and other factors operated so as to bind that nation to the
Crown as "a dependent ally, claiming the protection of a powerful friend
and .neighbor, and receiving the advantages of that protection, without involvmg a surrender of their national character". so Marshall notes that
u_nder the law of nations a weaker power does not necessarily surrender its
right of self-government by taking the protection of a stronger state and he
cites Vattel on the point. 81 The status of Indian nations within th~ United
States can be described, states Marshall in a related case, as that of
"domes~ic dependent nations". 82 While retaining internal autonomy, they
are considered both by the United States and by foreign states as being "so
completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States that
any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political connectiod with
them, would be considered by all as an invasion of our territory and an act
of hostility". 83
'
The fourth and final stage in the process occurs when the Indians' right
?f occupancy is e~tinguished in favour of the state. This may occur, according to Marshall, either by surrender under treaty or by forcible confiscation
a~d eviction in the course of war. The Chief Justice expresses differing
views as to which mode predominated in the past. In Johnson v. M'lntosh,
he suggests that "frequent and bloody wars" and the inexorable advancement of white settlement forced the Indians to retreat into the interior and
abandon their original lands, which were then parcelled out by the sovereign
power.s• His assessment seems to change somewhat in Worcester v.
Georgia, where he affirms that the King purchased the lands of the Indians,
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The Legal Basis of the Theory

when they were willing to sell, at a price they were willing to accep!, "but
never coerced a surrender of them" . 85 Allowing for overstatement m each
instance it seems fair to say that the Chief Justice envisaged both processes
as occur~ing at different times and places. The result in either case is simil~r.
The lands are freed of the Indian interest, which passes to the Crown or its
grantees.
.
.
.
We may now return to the series of questions posed earhe~ ~egar~mg
the impact of the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty upon abongmal title,
and the effects of the introduction of English land law. How does Marshall
go about reconciling Indian land rights with the f~udal h~erarchy envi~aged
by English law? The scheme envisaged by the Chief Justice as operatmg at
stage three is as follows. The Crown is recognized as feudal .overl?rd o~ Indian lands and holder of the ultimate title. So long as Indian title exists,
the Crowd's title is very limited in scope. Clearly, it entails an exclusive
power to extinguish Indian title by purchase or cessio~. Marshall also
recognizes that the Crown has the power to grant lands which are burdene?
by aboriginal title. In this case, .however, the .crown grants ?O m.ore than It
possesses itself, namely the ultimate fee subJect to the Indian ng?t
occupancy . So the grantee takes subject to native title, and only ~btam~ nghts
of use and occupancy when that title is extinguished. The Indians' n~ht of
occupancy imports full rights to use and exploit the resources of the.soil, the
right "to use it according to their own discretion'', ~ although t~eir power
to alienate it to non-natives is now limited to a nght of cess10n to the
Crown. The right of occupancy is not limited to "traditional" uses of the
land. There would be no apparent obstacle to a band of hunters turning to
farming, to raising cattle, or indeed to enga~ing in mining o_r .luill:bering.
The point is that the Crown's underlying title imports no.b~nef1~1al ~1ghts of
use unless or until the Indian title is extinguished. Abongmal title is thus a
uniform title, which does not vary from people to people.
If Indian lands cannot be sold to private individuals in the settler community the question arises whether they can be transferred among native
groups' themselves, whether by formal transactions, o~ by infor~a~ processes involving the migration of peoples and the mergmg and sphttmg of
bands. Chief Justice Marshall does not specifically address this question.
The logic of his argument suggests, however, that the exclusive right of the
Crown to extinguish Indian title is a right held as against other European
states and their subjects, as well as incoming settlers, subjects of the Crown.
It does not affect the fluid indigenous scheme of things, or limit the
possibility of lands passing from one native group to another. The questi?n
of which Indian nation held title to a given area would not normally anse
until land surrenders are taken, in which case the Indian group actually in
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possession would prima facie be accepted as the title-holder, regardless of
whether their possession was from "time immemorial" or the result of
more recent events. 81 Any other view wo.uld appear to render the surrender
process unworkable.
D. The Legal Basis of the Theory

One point emerges clearly from the judgment. The principles which the
court lays down derive largely from British law, and in particular from that
branch of the common law which governs the relations between Great Britain and its overseas possessions and provides the basic constitutional
framework for the colonies, - what is known as "colonial law". 88 The
legal status of Indian lands is determined by reference to Crown and
governmental practice in the American colonies, practice which is perceived
to reflect certain underlying legal principles. These principles are of a
general character and thus would apply prima f acie to all British colonies in
North America, including those now forming part of Canada. They might
also apply to British colonies in other parts of the world where similar conditions prevailed, such as the colonies in New Zealand and Australia.
It has been suggested, to the contrary, that the law applied by Chief
Justice Marshall is not English common law or colonial law, but rather the
law of Virginia as it had developed from the time of the first English settlement. Virginia law, it is argued, although perhaps originally based on the
common law, evolved in a distinctive manner, notably in its treatment of Indian land rights. 89 On this interpretation, the rules set out in Johnson v.
M'Intosh would not necessarily apply to other British colonies, even in
North America, much less farther afield.
The main difficulty with this view is that it derives little support from
the judgment itself. The court makes only brief references to Virginia law,
and then only to illustrate the general legal norms governing Indian lands
throughout British territories. Those norms are not presented as deriving
their universality from a purely accidental coincidence between the laws of
each particular American colony. Rather they are thought to apply as a
matter of principle in all the American colonies, except to the extent that
they have been modified by competent authority in any individual colony.
This point is illustrated by the court's remarks regarding a Virginia Act
of 1779, considered earlier, which declares that the government has an exclusive right of pre-emption over Indian lands, and provides that private

"For a different view, see, e.g., Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian
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" See, e.g., Charles Clark, A Summary of Colonial Law (London: 1834). The standard modern authority is Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial
Law (Londlon: 1966).
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purchases are void. 90 Marshall observes that the Act "may safely be considered as a unequivocal affirmance, on the part of Virginia, of the broad
principle which had always been maintained that the exclusive right to purchase from the Indians resided in the government". 9 ' This "broad principle" is thought to apply in the absence of particular legislation to the contrary. Its source, I suggest, is colonial law.
One must take care not to confuse colonial law, which is a body of
largely common law principles applying to British colonies generally, with
the substantive common law received in a particular colony. Colonial law
takes effect as regards a colony regardless of whether English common law
is ever introduced there. Thus it applied both to the colony of Quebec,
where French law was retained in most matters, and to the colony of
Massachusetts, where English common law was received.
The tendency to confound colonial law with the common law received
in a given colony is illustrated by an argument considered in the Australian
case of Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd. (1971). 92 The argument holds that it
was impossible for a common law doctrine recognizing native title to exist in
the colony of New South Wales, because in 1788, when the common law
was received there, no such doctrine could have existed in England, as there
were no aboriginals in England to whom it could apply. 93 If this approach
were correct, it would be equally impossible for English common law to
harbour rules governing the status of colonies, because there were no colonies within England to which they could apply. Such reasoning, or course,
ignores the fact that a distinct branch of the common law developed from at
least the seventeenth century onwards which governed the basic position of
British overseas possessions and their inhabitants, law derived principally
from the practice of the Crown, as recognized by judicial decision. 94 It is
this body of law which the court in Johnson v. M'Intosh applies.
E.

Critique

The doctrine elaborated by Chief Justice Marshall represents perhaps
the most sustained and convincing judicial effort yet made to explain what
happened when the disparate legal worlds of Europe and aboriginal
America met and clashed!. In its grasp of the issues, sense of history, and
relative sensitivity to the Indian outlook, the doctrine has few rivals. This is
not to say it is exempt from criticism.
The principle of discovery is a case in point. The Chief Justice asserts
that European colonizing powers agreed at an early stage that the first state
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!o discover a~ are~ of the New World had the exclusive right to appropriate
Modern h1stoncal scholars have been less certain on this point. 95 It is
known, for example, that both Fran\:ois I of France and Elizabeth I of
Eng!and. thre~ cold water on the contention that discovery conferred exclusive rights m the New World; such a principle was perceived as unduly
favourable to the pioneers in the field, Spain and Portugal. 96 While it is true
that the diplomatic armouries of most European colonial powers were
stocked with voyages of discovery (genuine or apocryphal) for use as cannon fodder in backing American claims, it is more difficult to find instances
where a discovery by one state was recognized by rival powers as sufficient
to bar them from the field. In other words, it remains doubtful how far
European colonial powers subscribed to the principle of discovery when it
was seen to operate against them, rather than in their favour.
.Even accepting, for the sake of argument, that some such principle was
adm1tte~ among European states, it is unclear whether the principle
necessarily ruled out purchases of Indian lands by private individuals. There
is a distinction between the acquisition of territorial title in the international
law. sense, .and the purchase of private title to lands. Even if we suppose that
a d1scovenng state gained an exclusive right against other European states
to appropriate the region discovered and thereby gain territorial title it does
not necessarily follow that a subject of the discovering sovereign c~uld not
purchase private title from the native peoples and hold it under the
sovereignty of the incoming monarch. Clearly a subject could not under
the principle, obtain international title to any portion of the discove~ed territory and set himself up as an independent potentate. But why could he not
secure a private title? The answer must lie, not in the principle of discovery
b~t in the domestic law of the European state concerned. If that la~
st1p~lat~s that t~e sove~e~g.n is the sole source of private title for subjects
settlmg m colonial acqms1t1ons, then private purchases from native peoples
are ruled out. Otherwise they would appear to be permissible.
It.
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These reflections reinforce the view that Marshall's theory rests
ultimately upon his understanding of British colonial law and practice, as
inherited and reaffirmed by the United States. His first argument, in particular, boils down to the proposition that, from the time of the early
Charters, the British Crown consistently claimed the exclusive power to deal
with Indian lands over which it asserted sovereignty, and sole authority to
extinguish Indian title by purchase or (in the case of war) by forcible appropriation. This claim, assuming that it was lawful under British law, unmistakably ruled out private purchases of Indian lands as a source of title
maintainable against the Crown. So far as non-Indian subjects were concerned, the Crown was the exclusive source of title.
I have emphasized here the degree to which Chief Justice Marshall
draws upon original British practice in America. As such, his theory
transcends its immediate American context, as an exposition of the earliest
principles of British colonial law governing relations between the Crown
and aboriginal peoples. The theory has considerable significance for
Canada, and also for such Commonwealth nations as New Zealand and
Australia.
It is interesting, therefore, to compare Marshall's view of aboriginal
title with a doctrine expounded at a slightly later period in the fledgling
colony of New Zealand, which was confronted with problems similar to
those arising in America.

VII. THE DOCTRINE OF ABORIGINAL TITLE
(R. v. SYMONDS)
The Queen (on the prosecution of C. H. Mcintosh) v. Symonds is a
case decided by the Supreme Court of New Zealand in 1847, during the
early days of the colony. 97 The claimant, Mcintosh, petitioned the court to
annul a Crown grant made to the defendant, Symonds, asserting prior title
to the same land by purchase from the Maori people, the original inhabitants of the islands. Mcintosh had bought the land after securing from
the colonial Governor a certificate waiving in his favour the Crown's exclusive right of pre-emption regarding native lands. The court ruled
unanimously against Mcintosh, holding that a private purchase of Maori
land could not give title, and that the Governor's certificate did not validate
the purchase. Two opinions were written in the case, one by Justice Chapman, the other by Chief Justice Martin. I will review them separately.
A. Chapman's Opinion
Justice Chapman bases his judgment on the law and practice of Great
Britain and its colonial offshoots, including the United States. He explains
this in a significant passage:
The intercourse of civilized nations, and especially of Great Britain, with
the aboriginal Natives of America and other countries, during the last two
centuries, has gradually led to the adoption and affirmation by the Colonial Courts of certain established principles of law applicable to such intercourse. Although these principles may at times have been lost sight of,
yet animated by the humane spirit of modern times, our colonial Courts,
and the Courts of such of the United States of America as have adopted
the common law of England, have invariably affirmed and supported
them; so that at this day, a line of judicial decision, the current of legal
opinion, and above all, the settled practice of the colonial Governments,
have concurred to clothe with certainty and precision what would otherwise have remained vague and unsettled. These principles are not the new
creation or invention of the colonial Courts. They flow not from what an
American writer has caUed the "vice of judicial legislation." They are in
fact to be found among the earliest settled principles of our law; and they
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are in part deduced from those higher principles, from charters made in
conformity with them, acquiesced in even down to the charter of our own
Colony; and from the letter of treaties with Native tribes, wherein those
principles have been asserted and acted upon.••

alienation to Europeans necessarily renders it somewhat inferior to an estate
in fee. However he notes that in practice native title is ample enough to
secure full enjoyment of the land, and allows the native people to deal as
freely with the land among themselves as they did prior to the coming of
102
Europeans. Chapman implies that indigenous systems of land tenure continued in force after the Crown's advent, at least for the internal purposes
of the native communities. Settlers, by contrast, were governed by English
law, and in particular by the rule that the Crown is the exclusive source of
title. Consequently they could obtain Jands only by Crown grant, not by
purchase directly from the native people. Before native lands entered the
governmental land system and became available for disposal by the Crown,
native title had first to be extinguished, normally by voluntary cession. The
resulting duality of land tenure systems is reflected in Chapman's remark
that private purchases by Europeans of native lands are not in fact absolutely null and void. "If care be taken to purchase off the true owners, and to
get in all outstanding claims, the purchases are good as against the Native
seller, but not against the Crown." 103
Justice Chapman does not attempt to characterize precisely the nature
of the Crown's interest in unsurrendered native lands. He canvasses various
possibilities, ranging from a full seisin in fee held by the Crown against
everyone except the natives, to a mere right of pre-emption. While not
reaching any definite conclusion, he seems to favour the latter view. He
observes that although the Stuart kings clearly assumed the fee to be in the
Crown, as evidenced by the American Charters of the seventeenth century,
it had not been the practice for more than a century, either in the British
colonies in America or subsequently in the United States, to permit any patent to pass the public seal previous to the extinguishment of the native
title. 10•

Chapman affirms here that relations between the Cro~n and the.na.tive inhabitants of British colonies are governed, at least partially, by prmciples of
law, and not merely by policy and expedien~y. Th~se pri~cipl.es form part
of a larger set of rules governing the colomes, which ~enve m tu:n from
basic precepts of the common law proper and the established colomal practice of the Crown, as recognized and affirmed by the courts.
It is a fundamental maxim of the common law, argues Chapman, that
the King is the original proprietor of all lands within th~ realm and the s~le
source of private title. This principle has been imported mto all the colomes
settled by Britain. Colonial courts have invariably ?eld, su~j~ct to rules of
prescription, that they can only give effect to titles denvmg from t~e
Crown verified by letters patent. It seems to follow from the same basic
maxim: continues Chapman, that no British subj.eel can acquire new lands
for himself. Any acquisition of territory by a sub1ect, whether by conquest,
discovery, occupation, or purchase from native tri~es, operates to the
benefit of the Crown, and confers no rights on the sub1ect. In short, Chapman concludes the Crown enjoys the exclusive right of acquiring new territory and exti~guishing the title of the native inhabitants. It follows that
the title asserted by the claimant is void, as founded upon a purchase from
the natives and a certificate from the Governor, neither amounting to letters
•
•
patent under the seal of the colony. 99
Chapman goes on to discuss the natur~ of. n~tlve Ja.nd :1ghts. ri:e
observes that the governmental practice of extmgmshmg native title by fair
purchase is over two centuries old. It has long been adopted by the governments of the British colonies in America, and by the United States. "It is
now", he concludes, "part of the law of the land, and altho~gh the Courts
of the United States, in suits between their own subjects, will not allow a
grant to be impeached under pretext that t~e Native titl~ has n.ot been extinguished, yet they would certainly not hesitate to do soma smt by one of
the Native Indians." 100 Native title is entitled to be respected, and "cannot
be extinguished (at least in times of peace) otherwise than by free consent of
•
•
•
the Native occupiers". 101
Like Marshall, then, Chapman holds that native title constitute~ a legal
right which is cognizable by the courts and entitled to their protection; the
right coexists with the Crown's title,1.mtil extinguished by s?r~ender. He
does not define the title more exactly, save to say that the restnct1on on free

B.

Martin's Opinion

The theory adopted by the second judge in the case, Chief Justice
Martin, is akin to that espoused by Chapman. He states that, under British
colonial law, English subjects who appropriated unoccupied lands in an
overseas territory to which England held prior title as against other European nations did not thereby acquire any legal right to the soil as against the
Crown. This principle, he maintains, applied with equal force whether the
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"The legal doctrine as to the exclusive right of the Queen to extinguish the Native
title ... [leaves] the Natives to deal among themselves, as freely as before the
commencement of our intercourse with them .... Technically, it contemplates
the Native dominion over the soil as inferior to what we call an estate in fee: practically, it secures to them all the enjoyments from the land which they had before
our intercourse . . . "; ibid., at 39 l.
Ibid., at 390.
Ibid., at 391-92.
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country was already partially populated or completely uninhabited, and
whether the settlers obtained lands with or without the consent of the
original inhabitants. Accordingly, colonial titles have rested uniformly
upon Crown grants. The rule, he concludes, has been enforced by England
both in its American colonies and in Australia, and also by the United
States. 105
Martin, like his fellow-judge, presumes that native title coexists with
some sort of underlying title of the Crown, but he does not attempt to
characterize either with much exactitude. Native title, in his view, continues
to exist following the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty until extinguished
in favour of the Crown. It is not a mere creature of policy, but constitutes a
legal title cognizable by the courts. '° 6 Speaking of the New Zealand Land
Claims Ordinance of 1841, Martin states: "It is everywhere assumed that
where the Native owners have fairly and freely parted with their lands the
same at once vest in the Crown, and become subject wholly to the disposing
power of the Crown." 101 Later he reiterates: "So soon, then, as the right of
the Native owner is withdrawn, the soil vests entirely in the Crown for the
behoof of the nation." 108 The use of the term "Native owner" in both
passages seems significant. Martin sums up his views as follows: "whenever
the original Native right is ceded in respect of any portion of the soi1 of
these Islands, the right which succeeds thereto is not the right of any individual subject of the Crown, ... but the right of the Crown on behalf of
the whole nation .... "He continues: "the land becomes from the moment
of cession not the private property of one man, but the heritage of the whole
people; . . . " i 09
These observations leave little room for doubt that the native inhabitants are considered to hold a legal title akin to ownership, which passes
to the Crown upon surrender and thereby completes the Crown's title.
Nevertheless, near the end of this judgment Martin makes a puzzling
remark. Referring to the plaintiff's claim that a private purchase of native
land overrides a subsequent Crown grant, he states that the plaintiff "cannot possibly stand in a better position than did the original land claimants.
He cannot possess, any more than they did, a title against the Crown or the
Crown's grantee." 110 Some have taken this to mean that the Crown's title to
native-held lands is complete even prior to the surrender of native title, or at
least that a Crown grant effectively extinguishes native rights. Such an inter-

Ibid., at 393.
He quotes Kent's Commentaries on American Law: "The Natives were admitted
to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain
possession of it and to use it according to their own discretion ... "; ibid., at 393.
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pretation, however, cannot easily be squared with earlier passages. It seems
more likely that Martin means only to emphasize that native title does not
stan~ in opp~sition to the Crown's title (or that of a Crown grantee), but
coexists with it. Even assuming, then, that the plaintiff stood in the shoes of
the original native owners, this would not enable him to secure the annulment of a Crown grant. His title, like that of the natives, far from being inconsistent with the Crown's title, would amount to a burden upon it until
extinguished by surrender.

Conclusion

VIII. CONCLUSION
The reasoning in the Symonds case is particularly interesting because it
extends the basic principles laid down for the American colonies by Chief
Justice Marshall to a British colony acquired at a later stage, under different
circumstances, in a distant region of the world. The essential link is provided by British colonial law. Although the judges in Symonds do not refer to
Johnson and Worcester by name, it is clear that they draw heavily upon
these decisions for inspiration. 111
In Canada as well, courts have looked to Marshall's judgments for
guidance on questions of aboriginal rights. The process began as early as
1867, the year of Confederation, when Justice Monk of the Quebec
Superior Court quoted at length from Worcester in a judgment upholding
the validity of a marriage between a white man and an Indian woman under
Cree customary law. 112 Marshall's views were cited extensively in the
famous St. Catherine's Milling Co. case, as it moved through the Ontario
and Canadian courts to the Privy Council. 1 u Justice Strong's comments in
the Supreme Court of Canada seem particularly apt:

The Privy Council:s decision in St. Catherine's does not explicitly refer to
the Marshall doctrme. However both Johnson and Worcester are cited in
~rgument, ~sis.the Symonds case, 115 and the Privy Council's characterization of Indian title as a usufructuary right burdening the underlying title of
the Crown shows the influence of Marshall's thinking. 116
. ~ore recent~y, the Supreme Court of Canada, in the leading Canadian
d~c1~~?n o~ ~bonginal title, Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, explicitly adopted the Marshall doctrine. Although the court split on
~he result, the. two major opinions written, representing six of the seven
Judges, b<_>th cite Johnson and Worcester approvingly, and quote extracts
f~om the JU?gments. 118 Justice Judson, in particular, notes that the Canadian ,court~ ~n th; St. f!a.therine's case were "strongly influenced" by Marshall s .dec1S1on m defmmg the nature of Indian title, and that the Privy
Council followed their lead.
It seems safe to conclude that the new Canadian Constitution in ]ts
rec?~nition and affirmation of "existing aboriginal rights'', repres;nts an
official ~nd~>rsement of the b.asic tenets of the doctrine of aboriginal title,
~nd .a re1ect10n of the competmg theories of a legal vacuum, radical discontmmty, and common law dispossession. This provision stands witness to
the remarkable vitality of the ideas put forward by Chief Justice Marshall,
more than a century and a half after they were first expressed.
119

The value and importance of these authorities is not merely that they show
that the same doctrine as that already propounded regarding the title of
the Indians to unsurrendered lands prevails in the United States, but, what
is of vastly greater importance, they without exception refer its origin to a
date anterior to the revolution and recognise it as a continuance of the
principles oflaw or policy as to Indian titles then established by the British
government, and therefore identical with those which have aJso continued
to be recognized and applied in British North America. 114
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